By Christian Harm
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Yet, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) have examined the governance of mutuals versus PLC financial institutions paying particular attention to the takeover market as a governance institution. They conclude that the evidence of actual experiences in the takeover market suggests that they may not be suitable for a textbook corporate governance role73. Most importantly, they argue that competition in the product markets is the most successful disciplining device in either corporate form. Thus, they soundly reject the notion that mutuals should be forced to convert to PLC’s based on the suspicion of a governance problem due to the lack of a market for corporate control motivated by their ownership structure.
In a large enterprise, liquidation of isolated assets may eradicate still existing going concern values. In an illiquid market for large business units, the downsizing process may need active and skillful management to realize going concern values. When loans are in threat of non-performance, selecting a manager experienced at downsizing to sell off parts of the firm in order to repay loans can be a natural role for creditors. In that sense, the right for managerial selection is an extension of a broader defined liquidation motive.
In the end, shareholder value maximization was never intended to stand for the complete disregard of all other interested parties49. Accordingly, no shareholder value proponent would argue that it is the job of managers to identify externalities and loopholes. These are to some extent evidence of contract incompleteness, which represents an undesirable friction in social life. In the purist corporate governance ideal, shareholders are the ones having discretionary control over the management process, since they stand the most 47 Banks may, for example, have a better lobby to effect regulatory forbearance.